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Abstract 
Corporate governance received much attention during the last two decades owing to certain economic reforms in 
countries and accidents of economic history such as regional market crisis and large corporate debacles. The main 
objective of the study is to find out the significant difference between corporate governance practices on Firm 
performance. And the secondary objective is to suggest the listed manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka to get the 
efficiency in the firm performance through the best corporate governance practices. Twenty eight listed 
manufacturing firms were selected as sample size in Colombo Stock Exchange for the periods 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010 and 2011. Independent sample one – way Anova (f-test) and Independent sample t-test have been utilized to 
find out the significant difference between corporate governance practices on firm performance. Finding revealed 
that, there is no significant mean different between the firm performance among corporate governance practices as 
board leadership structure, board committees, board meetings and proportion of non executive directors. We have 
suggested that, corporate governance practices should be reviewed in the systematic way to frame the best practices 
in the current Sri Lankan context.  
Key Words: Corporate Governance practices, Firm Performance, Listed Manufacturing Firms. 
1. Background of the study 
 
Global financial crisis points out the importance of a strong corporate governance and financial management for a 
company that has to deal with effects of unexpected crises and uncertainties that bear future business events. 
Effective financial management decisions in the field of  horizontal and vertical structure of capital,  insurance  
of  short-term  and  long-term  capital,  maintaining  liquidity  and  solvency are viewed as  a key function 
in the creation of competitive advantages (Mulili and Wong, 2011). According to the Australian Standard (2003), the 
corporate governance is considered as the process, by which organizations are directed, controlled and held to 
account. This implies that corporate governance encompasses the authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, 
direction and control exercised in the process of managing organizations. Further, Morin and Jarrell (2001) argued 
the corporate governance mechanism, it implies that corporate governance mechanism is a framework that controls 
and safeguards the interest of  the  relevant  players  in  the  market  which  include  managers,  
employees,  customers, shareholders, executive management, suppliers and the board of directors. Comparing with 
the approach of Australian Standard, Morin and Jarrell (2001) have jointly approached the corporate governance in 
the holistic way; it implies that, corporate governance practices are the strategies which should be formulated, in line 
with the short, medium and long term objectives of the company with the interest of stakeholders. In this context, 
Firm performance is an important concept that relates to the way and manner in which financial resources available 
to an organization are judiciously used to achieve the overall corporate objective of an organization, it keeps the 
organization in business and creates a greater prospect for future opportunities ( Kajola ,2008). And also, good 
corporate governance practices contribute and enhance a firm’s performance (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Chung et al, 
2003). Meanwhile, corporate governance rules have been mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
SriLaka.  But, we have seen the differences between the practices and mandatory issues on the corporate 
governance in the listed companies except banking institutions in SriLanka. In which, the board structure and board 
committees have the significant difference between practical issues and mandatory issues (Senaratne and Gunaratne, 
------------; Kumudini, 2011). In the case of board structure, the first issue that the srilankan code required for 
effective corporate governance was separation of the top two positions of the board (CEO and Chairman). And also, 
in the case of board committee, listed companies should form the three committees as audit, remuneration and 
European Journal of Business and Management                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.1, 2013 
 
20 
 
nomination (Code of best practice on corporate governance, 2008). Because, three committees have the unique duties 
and responsibilities compare with each other. Due to that, this study is focused to answerer the research question as: 
Is there any significant different between corporate governance practices on the firm performance.    
 
2. Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to find out the significant difference between corporate governance practices on 
Firm performance. And the secondary objective is to suggest the listed manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka to get the 
efficiency in the firm performance through the best corporate governance practices.  
3. Theoretical and Empirical Perspective: Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Performance 
Corporate governance received much attention during the last two decades owing to certain economic reforms in 
countries and accidents of economic history such as regional market crisis and large corporate debacles ( Senaratne 
and Gunaratne,------------). Scholars normally describe the evolution of the corporate governance in terms of changes 
in relationship between ownership and control (Chandler, 1977; Fligstein, 1990). The idea of corporate governance 
was quickly adopted in different parts of the world but with some major variations because circumstances vary from 
country to country (Mulili and Wong, 2011).  In this context, two main approaches of corporate governance can be 
identified as Agency theory and Stewardship theory. According to the Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Agency theory is 
viewed as the separation of control from ownership. It implies that the professional managers manage a firm on 
behalf of the firm’s owners. Further , the theory suggests that a firm’s top management should have a significant 
ownership of the firm in order to secure a positive relationship between corporate governance and the amount of 
stock owned by the top management (Mulini and Wong, 2011; Mallin, 2004). In contrast the Stewardship theory is 
considered as stake holder’s theory. The theory suggests that a firm’s board of directors and its CEO, acting as 
Stewards, are more motivated to act in the best interests of the firm rather than for their own selfish interests ( Mulini 
and Wong, 2011). Furthermore, Kajananthan (2012) have identified the dimensions of the corporate governance 
practices as leadership style, board committee, board size, board meeting, and board composition in the SriLankan 
Manufacturing firm’s perspective.  
Scholars in the corporate governance have found that good corporate governance enhances a firm’s performance 
(Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Lee et al, 1992; Chung et al, 2003). Mean while, other studies have reported negative 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Bathala and Rao, 1995) or have not found any 
relationship (Park and Shin, 2003; Singh and Davidson, 2003). Further, Mokhtar, Sori, Hamid, Abidin,  Nasir, 
Yaacob, Mustafa , Daud and  Muhamad (2009) have approached the study on the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and company performance. Study was performed to compare the performance between five 
Malaysian companies that practice good corporate governance and another five Malaysian companies that did not 
practice good corporate governance. It is found that there is no difference in performance between companies that 
practice good corporate governance and companies that do not practice good corporate governance. 
4. Conceptualization  
Based on the research question and objectives of the study, the following conceptual model has been constructed. 
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Figure no 1: Conceptualization Model 
Where:  
CGP: Corporate Governance Practices 
FP: Firm Performance 
BLS: Board Leadership Structure  
PNED: Proportionate of non executive directors in the board  
BC: Board Committees 
BM: Board Meeting 
 
5. Design of the variables: Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables 
 
Table No 1: Design of the variables 
Concept Variables Measures Symbols 
Corporate 
Governance Practices 
Board Leadership 
Structure 
1 for separate Leader ship and 2 for combined 
Leadership 
BLS 
Proportionate of non 
executive directors in 
the board 
1 for below the measure 0.70 and 2 for beyond the 
measure 0.70 
PNED 
Board Committees 
 
If  less than two committees which has been 
represented as 1; available of  all three committees 
has been represented as 2 
BC 
Board Meeting 
 
 
 Based on the No of meeting; 1- 5 has been 
represented as 1; 6- 10 has been represented as 2; 
11-15 has been represented as 3. 
BM 
Firm Performance Return on Equity Profit after interest & tax/Share holders fund * 100 
 
ROE 
 
   CGP 
BLS 
PNED 
BC 
BM 
   FP 
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Board Leadership structure, Board composition (Proportionate of non executive directors in the board), Board 
committees and Board meeting are considered as the key variables to determine the corporate governance practices ( 
Kumudini,2011; Kajananthan, 2012). And also, Firm performance is measured by the Return on equity (Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992; Lee et al, 1992; Chung et al, 2003). 
 
6. Hypotheses of the Study 
H1: There is a significant mean different between firm performances across the Board Leadership Structure. 
H2: There is a significant mean different between firm performances across the Proportionate of non executive 
directors in the board. 
H3: There is a significant mean different between firm performances across the Board Committees. 
H4: There is a significant mean different between firm performances across the Board Meeting. 
 
7. Methodology 
7.1. Data collection 
Data on corporate governance and firm performances were collected from secondary sources as Annual reports of 
the manufacturing companies, Colombo stock exchange publications and URL of the Colombo stock exchange. 
7.2. Sample Selection 
Twenty eight listed manufacturing firms were selected as sample size in Colombo Stock Exchange for the periods 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. Further, earlier mentioned firms have been selected based on the availability of 
data on the corporate governance practices and firm performance of the listed manufacturing firms in SriLanka. 
7.3. Data Analysis Method 
Various Statistical methods have been utilized to compare the data collection from twenty eight listed manufacturing 
firms in Colombo Stock Exchange on corporate governance practices and firm performance.   
Descriptive statistics which involve in collecting, summarizing and presenting data. This analysis is given 
information for the data through the frequency distribution, central tendency, and the dispersion. 
Inferential statistical tools which involve in drawing conclusions about a population based on the sample data. In 
which Independent sample one – way Anova (f-test) and Independent sample t-test have been utilized to find out the 
significant difference between corporate governance practices on firm performance. 
 
8. Results and analysis 
8.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table No 2: Descriptive Statistics of the study 
Dimension Mean Standard Deviation 
Board  Leadership 
Structure 
 
1.42 
0.50 
Board Committee 1.14 
.35 
Board Meeting 2.03 
.88 
Proportion of Non 
executive Directors 
 
1.57 
.50 
Return on equity                           
4.89 
21.36               
 
Based on the mean value in the descriptive studies, Return on equity is not in line with the standards. According to 
the Charted Institute of Management Accountants, Over 11 percentage of return of equity denotes the high return, 
and also percentage 2-5 denotes the risk margin. 
Manufacturing firms in SriLanka are in the problematic situation to earn profit on the equity (Based on the Mean 
value of the Return on equity). Due to that, firms should focus on the return on the equity and capital employed in 
the proactive way.  
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8.2. Independent Sample t-test 
In this study, Independent Sample t-test is utilized to find out the significant mean different between the firm 
performance across the Board Leadership Structure, Proportionate of non executive directors in the board and Board 
Committees. 
Board Leadership Structure Vs Firm Performance 
Based on the group statics, sixteen listed manufacturing firms have utilized the separate leader ship in the board 
structure, and rest of the twelve firms has utilized the combined leader ship in the board structure. 
 
Table No 3:  Results of t-test for Board Leadership Structure 
                                                                                                          
Note: Significant at 0.05 levels 
 
Based on the table no 3, there is no significant mean different between Firm Performance across the Board 
Leadership Structure (P > 0.05). It means that, both separate or combined leadership structure in the corporate 
governance practices have earned the same level of return on equity approximately.   
Hence Hypothesis one is rejected. 
Proportionate of non executive directors in the board Vs Firm Performance 
Based on the group statics, out of twenty eight listed manufacturing firms, twelve firms have utilized the non 
executive directors who have the proportion below 70 % in board size.  And rest of the sixteen firms has utilized the 
non executive directors who have the proportion beyond 70 % in board size. 
Table No 4:  Results of t-test for Proportionate of non executive directors 
                                                                                                        
Note: Significant at 0.05 levels 
Based on the table no 4, there is no significant mean different between Firm performance across the Proportionate of 
non executive directors in the board (P > 0.05).  
Hence Hypothesis two is rejected. 
 
Board Committees Vs Firm Performance 
Based on the group statics, out of twenty eight listed manufacturing firms, four firms have formed the all three 
committees as Audit, Remuneration, and Nomination. And rest of the twenty four firms has formed the one or two 
committees in the board structure perspective. 
 
Table No 5:  Results of t-test for Board Committees 
                                                                                                          
Note: Significant at 0.05 levels 
t-test variable  t-value P value Mean difference 
Return on equity -.422 .676 -3.497 
t-test variable  t-value P value Mean difference 
Return on equity -.767 .450 - 6.309 
t-test variable  t-value P value Mean difference 
Return on equity .104 .918 1.220 
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Based on the table no 5, there is no significant mean different between Firm performance across the Board 
Committees (P > 0.05). 
Hence Hypothesis three is rejected. 
 
8.3. Independent Sample one –way ANOVA test 
One –way ANOVA test can be utilized to find out the significant mean different between Firm performance across 
the Board Meeting. 
Board Meeting Vs Firm Performance 
Based on the descriptive statics, out of twenty eight listed manufacturing firms, ten firms have conducted the 
meetings which have the frequency as one to five meetings per annum. And also another ten firms have conducted 
the meetings which have the frequency as six to ten meetings per annum. Finally rest of firms has conducted the 
meetings which have the frequency as eleven to fifteen meetings per annum.   
Table No 6:  Results of f-test for Board Meeting 
 
 
 
                                                                                         
Note: 
Significant at 0.05 levels  
Based on the table no 6, there is no significant mean different between firm performance across the Board meetings 
(P > 0.05). 
Hence Hypothesis four is rejected. 
 
9. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, the research question as “is there any significant different between corporate governance practices on 
the firm performance” should be answered by the proper research methodology. Due to that, Independent sample one 
– way Anova (f-test) and Independent sample t-test have been utilized to find out the significant difference between 
corporate governance practices on firm performance. Based on the overall study findings, we are able to come to the 
point that, there is no significant mean different between the firm performance among corporate governance 
practices as board leadership structure, board committees, board meetings and proportion of non executive directors.  
In the case of Board leadership structure, Kumudini (2011) has pointed that separation of responsibilities at the top 
promotes better results, because the chairman is accountable to the formulation of strategy and the CEO is 
accountable to the implementation of the strategy and the day-to-day operation of the firm. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that higher profitability for firms in Sri Lanka is due to better management, as a result of the separation of 
the position of CEO and chairman. In contrast, we have found that, there is no significant mean different between 
firm performances across the Board Leadership Structure as separate and combined leadership in the listed 
manufacturing firms in srilanka. It means that both separate or combined leadership structure in the corporate 
governance practices have earned the same level of return on equity approximately.  In supportive way, Abdullah 
(2004) has noted that board leadership structure is not related to performance, because financial ratios may not 
capture the board and leadership roles in establishing a firm’s value, but long-term measures such as firm’s growth 
and their share price might be useful measures. 
In the case of Proportionate of non executive directors in the board, Kumudini (2011) has approached that 
non-executive directors have a significant impact on firm performance in Sri Lanka. In contrast, we have found that, 
there is no significant mean different between Firm performances across the Proportionate of non executive directors 
in the board in the srilankan context. In the case of board committees, Weir , Laing  & McKnight ( 2002) have 
viewed that, board committees had no influence on the firm performance in the United Kingdom context, in the same 
way we have found that, there is no significant mean different between Firm performance across the Board 
Committees. In contrast, Kumudini (2011) has pointed that Boards committees composed of audit, remuneration 
and/or nomination committees are positively associated with firm performance. Meanwhile, in our research frame, 
out of twenty eight listed manufacturing firms, four firms have formed the all three committees as Audit, 
Remuneration, and Nomination. And rest of the twenty four firms has formed the one or two committees in the board 
structure perspective. This may lead to the results as not significant level, because, Based on the study sample, only 
f-test variable  f-value P value 
Return on equity 1.208 .316 
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four firms have utilized the three committees in the listed manufacturing firms in the SriLankan context. In the case 
of board meeting, we have found that, there is no significant mean different between firm performances across the 
Board Meeting.  
According to the Senaratne and Gunaratne (------------). We have suggested that, corporate governance practices 
should be reviewed in the Sri Lankan Context. In this context, board perspective should be adopted in future 
corporate governance reforms based on the stake holder approach to corporate governance rather than focusing only 
on the share holder primacy which gives a narrow connotation to corporate governance. Further greater 
independence and authority needs to be granted to oversight committees within the firm. In particular, the roles and 
functions of the remuneration and audit committees need to be strengthened. This will serve to facilitate both 
transparency and accountability within firm. Further, the corporate governance practices used in developed countries 
are not directly applicable in developing economies because of political, economic, technological and cultural 
differences. It denotes that there is a need to develop models of corporate governance that consider the conditions in 
each developing country and that are not directly borrowed from developed countries. 
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